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Abstract 
Reaching approximately US levels of productivity and employment are the most prominent 
Lisbon targets. This paper uses a multi country endogenous growth model to identify possible 
sources for the productivity gap between the EU and the US and to look at policies which 
could help to close this gap. The framework allows us to explain differences in productivity 
and R&D spending levels in terms of differences in taxation, subsidies to R&D, mark ups in 
labour and goods markets, entry barriers, the efficiency of the R&D sector and the skill 
composition of the labour force. The paper tries to provide a ranking of the relative 
importance of these factors for explaining the productivity gap. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
European Commission.  2
Introduction 
 
In the post war period Western Europe has caught up with the US in terms of productivity. 
This process came to an end in the mid 90s. Since then the productivity gap to the US 
remained fairly stable at around 10%. Also, on average Europeans work about 20% less than 
Americans. There has been a long debate how this gap in productivity and employment could 
possibly be explained. There is a sizeable literature which blames product market regulations 
- leading to higher mark ups of prices over marginal cost - as a major reason for the income  
gap. In a recent simulation exercise Bayoumi et al. (2004) estimates that increasing 
competition in the goods market to US levels could increase GDP per capita by about 7% and 
employment by about 3%. Another literature blames labour taxation as a major factor for 
explaining differences in employment. For example, Daveri et al (2000) conclude that more 
than 50% of the increase in the unemployment rate could be explained by rising labour 
taxation. Prescott (2003) claims that labour taxation could possibly explain entirely why 
Americans work more than Europeans. There are however also other dimensions in which the 
US economy differs from the European economy. The US has a higher average skill level of 
the labour force and it invests more in R&D. This raises at least three sets of questions. First, 
can differences in the skill endowment between Europe and the US explain the remaining 
productivity and employment gap? To what extent could higher R&D expenditure shares be 
explained by differences in market structure? And third are there other differences between 
Europe and the US, such as for example differences in the efficiency of knowledge 
production or differences in the volume of R&D subsidies which could account for the 
productivity and employment gap?  
 
In order to address these issues this paper uses a two country (semi) endogenous growth 
model which we calibrate such as to replicate the basic stylised facts in the EU(27) and the 
US. We identify differences in product market competition (at a sectoral level: intermediate 
and final output), labour taxation, R&D subsidies, entry costs, skill composition of the labour 
force and R&D technology and examine how differences in these factors account for 
differences in productivity, employment, skill premium and R&D expenditure. 
 
The analysis of cross-country income differences and the development of world economic 
growth require models in which technology choices and technological progress are 
endogenized. We therefore draw on the immense body of theoretical and empirical work that 
emerged in the 1980s. Aghion and Howitt (2005) distinguish three main endogenous growth 
paradigms. The first version is the AK-theory, which is a neoclassical growth model without 
imposing diminishing returns on capital. The second version of endogenous growth models 
followed the product-variety paradigm (see Romer (1990)) in which innovation generates 
endogenous productivity growth by creating new varieties of products. The third paradigm 
arises from industrial organization theory (see Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998)), and it is 
commonly referred to "Schumpeterian" growth theory. This paradigm involves the 
Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction via focusing on quality improving innovations 
which forces obsolete products out of the market. Recent models of directed technological 
change developed in Acemoglu (1998, 2002 and 2007) can be considered as new paradigm in 
which the direction of technological change is  also endogenized. 
 
The product-variety paradigm along with some earlier R&D based models in the literature 
shares the prediction of empirically unjustified scale-effects: if the level of resources devoted 
to R&D - for instance measured by the number of scientists engaged in R&D - is doubled,   3
then the per capita growth rate of output should also double in the steady state. Jones (1995, 
2005) offers an alternative setting for the product-variety paradigm, a semi-endogenous 
growth model which is free from the inconsistent scale-effects. In this paper we extend the 
Jones model with international knowledge-spillovers to capture the endogenous development 
of R&D. The preference for semi-endogenous growth models to fully endogenous structures 
is also supported by Botazzi and Peri (2007) which provides econometric evidence against the 
existence of strong scale effects. The results of Botazzi and Peri (2007) favours semi-
endogenous models of growth which imply weak scale effects: the level of R&D resources 
positively relates to the level of technological knowledge. In addition to the R&D framework, 
our model also includes the disaggregation of labour into three skill-groups (low-, medium,- 
and high-skilled) and the corresponding dynamics of the working age and student population. 
All extensions are built on DG ECFIN's QUESTIII model which closely follows the DSGE 
structure described in Ratto et al. (2006). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section one we describe the model, section two provides 
details on the calibration. Section three presents the simulation results to identify the possible 
sources for the productivity gap between the EU and the US and the final section concludes. 
   
1.  Model 
 
The model links two open economies, the European Union and the United States. The 
economies are populated by households, final and intermediate good producer firms, a 
research industry, a monetary and a fiscal authority. In the final and intermediate sector firms 
produce differentiated goods which are imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. Final 
good producers use a composite of domestic and imported intermediate goods and three types 
of labour - (low-, medium-, and high-skilled) - during the production process. The 
intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive firms that have purchased a 
design from the R&D sector and using this design they transform capital into intermediate 
goods. The production of new designs depends on the existing stock of domestic and foreign 
ideas and the share of high-skilled labour engaged in research. Technological change is 
modelled as increasing product variety in the tradition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). We 
distinguish between households which are liquidity constrained and consume their disposable 
income and households who have full access to financial markets. The latter make decisions 
on financial and real capital investments. 
 
1.1 Firms 
 
1.1.1 Final output producers 
 
Each firm produces a variety of the domestic good which is imperfect substitute for the 
varieties produced by other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are 
monopolistically competitive in the goods market and face a demand function for goods. 
Domestic firms sell to private domestic households, to other firms, the government and to 
exporting firms. All demand sectors have identical CES preferences across domestic varieties, 
with an elasticity of substitution 
d σ . Demand for an individual firm depends on aggregate 
consumption of households  t C , government purchases of goods and services 
G
t C , 
government investment 
G
t I , demand for inputs of investment goods producing firms 
inp
t I  and 
exports  t X . The demand function for firm  j  is therefore given by   4
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Final output (
j Y ) is produced using D A  variety of domestic intermediate inputs ( D x ) and A
F 
variety of imported intermediates (
F
D x ) with an elasticity of substitution θD. The final good 
sector does not directly use capital as an input, only the intermediate goods that are produced 
from capital. Intermediate inputs enter into the production function combined with a CES 
aggregate of three labour types in a Cobb-Douglas technology form: 
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The ζ   parameters reflect the taste or biasedness for imported vs. domestic inputs,   i s   is the 
population share of labour-force in subgroup i (L, low-,  M, medium- and H, high-skilled),  
i L  denotes the employment rate of population i,  i ef  is the corresponding efficiency unit, and  
L σ  is the elasticity of substitution between different labour types. Note that high-skilled 
labour in the final goods sector is the total high-skill employment minus the high-skilled 
labour working for the R&D sector ( A L ). For the foreign regions the production functions 
take similar structural form but we allow the structural parameters θ  and ζ to be region-
specific. Firms also decide about the degree of capacity utilisation (
j
t ucap ). The above 
production function combines two important structures which coexist in the literature of 
international R&D diffusion and endogenous R&D accumulation. First, it employs the idea of 
product variety framework proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and applied in the literature 
of international trade and R&D diffusion
1, but we will explicitly model the underlying 
development of R&D by extending the semi-endogenous framework of Jones (1995 and 
2005) in a multiregional setting
2.  
 
                                                 
1 See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
2 Butler and Pakko (1998) also applied Jones (1995) semi-endogenous growth framework to examine the effect 
of endogenous technological change on the properties of a real business cycle model without any international 
R&D spillovers. The model we present here is much richer in many aspects and it is able to capture two channels 
of international R&D spillovers: a.) through the international trade of different varieties of intermediate goods in 
a structure proposed by Gagnon (2005) and via the production process of R&D products which depends not 
only on the domestic but the foreign stock of knowledge as well, following the empirical work of Botazzi and 
Peri (2007).   5
The objective of the firm is to maximise profits 
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pD  and 
F
D px
*  are the domestic and import prices of intermediate inputs expressed in domestic 
currency. Firms also face technological and regulatory constraints which restrict their price 
setting, employment and capacity utilisation decisions. Price setting rigidities can be the result 
of the internal organisation of the firm or specific customer-firm relationships associated with 
certain market structures. Costs of adjusting labour have a strong job specific component (e.g. 
training costs) but higher employment adjustment costs may also arise in heavily regulated 
labour markets with search frictions. Costs associated with the utilisation of capital can result 
from higher maintenance costs associated with a more intensive use of a piece of capital 
equipment. The following convex functional forms are chosen. 
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The firm determines labour, intermediate input, capacity utilisation and prices optimally in 
each period given the technological and administrative constraints as well as demand 
conditions. The maximization conditions are given by: 
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where   t η   is the Lagragian multiplier of the technological constraint and rt  is the real interest 
rate. Firms equate the marginal product of labour, net of marginal adjustment costs, to wage 
costs. As can be seen from the left hand side of equation (5a), the convex part of the 
adjustment cost function penalises in cost terms accelerations and decelerations of changes in 
employment. Equation (5b) determines the optimal capacity utilisation by equating the 
marginal product of capital services to the marginal cost of increasing capacity. Equations of 
(5c) state the first order conditions for domestic and imported intermediates and (5d) defines 
the mark up factor as a function of the elasticity of substitution and changes in inflation. The 
average mark up is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. We follow the 
empirical literature and allow for additional backward looking elements by assuming that a 
fraction   ) 1 ( sfp −  of firms index price increases to inflation in   1 − t  . Finally we also allow 
for a mark up shock. This leads to the following specification 
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1.1.2  Demand and supply of domestic and foreign intermediate goods 
 
The intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive firms that have 
purchased a design from the domestic R&D sector. The  A P  price of each new design is the 
cost of entry into the market for each individual firm. Intermediate firms should also bear 
additional fixed costs denoted by  A FC . The cost of capital rented from the household sector is  
D K i ,  . Exchange rates are expressed in region F's currency (eF). Firms that have purchased a 
design can then transform each unit of capital into a single unit of the intermediate input. 
Intermediate firms can sell their products for domestic or foreign final good producers. From 
the final good firms profit maximization problem (equation (4)) we can derive that domestic 
intermediate firms face with the following three demand curves for their products
3: 
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3We neglect the time dimension because there is no lagged or lead variable in the decision problem of the 
intermediate firms. 
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where  D p  and  D x  are the domestic price and quantity of intermediate inputs, 
D
F px  and 
D
F x  
denote the price and volume of export to the foreign region where the price is translated into 
the importing region's currency with the corresponding exchange rates and  P is the price of 
final output. Each domestic intermediate firm, then, solves the following profit-maximisation 
problem every period: 
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The first order conditions are 
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The symmetric structure of the market implies the following conditions for prices: 
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Since intermediate firms transform one unit of capital into one unit of intermediate goods the 
following equation must hold for the total volume of capital 
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The no-arbitrage condition requires that 
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1.1.3  R&D sector 
 
Innovation corresponds to the discovery of a new variety of producer durables that provides 
an alternative way of producing the final consumer good. Assume that a part of high-skilled 
labour (LA) engages in R&D to search for new designs and produces new available variety of 
the intermediate goods according to the following R&D equation: 
 
(7) 
λ φ ζ ν t A t D t F t D L A A A , 1 , 1 , , − − = Δ . 
 
In this framework we account for the international R&D spillovers following Botazzi and Peri 
(2007).  Parameters ζ and  φ  measure the foreign and domestic spillover effects from the 
aggregate international and domestic stock of knowledge ( F A  and  D A ) respectively. Negative 
value for these parameters can be interpreted as the "fishing out" effect, i.e. when innovation 
decreases with the level of knowledge, while positive values refer to the "standing on 
shoulders" effect and imply positive research spillovers. Note that   1 = φ   would give back the 
strong scale effect feature of fully endogenous growth models with respect to the domestic 
level of knowledge. Parameter ν  can be interpreted as total factor efficiency of R&D 
production, while λ  measures the elasticity of R&D production on the number of researchers 
( A L ). 
We assume that the R&D sector is operated by a Research Institute which hires researchers 
from the labour market paying wage  H W , - the market wage of high skilled labour - to the 
individual researchers. We also assume that the Research Institute faces an adjustment cost of 
hiring new employees and maximizes the following discounted profit-stream: 
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therefore the first order condition implies: 
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where   t d   is the discount factor. 
 
 
1.2.2 Investment goods producers 
 
There is a perfectly competitive investment goods production sector which combines 
domestic and foreign final goods, using the same CES aggregators as households and 
governments do to produce investment goods for the domestic economy. Denote the 
aggregate of domestic and foreign inputs used by the investment goods sector with 
inp
t I , then 
real output of the investment goods sector is produced by the following linear production 
function,  
 
(8) 
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where 
I
t U  is a technology shock to the investment good production technology which itself 
follows a random walk with drift 
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Given our assumption concerning the input used in the investment goods production sector, 
investment goods prices are given by 
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1.2 Households: 
 
The household sector consists of a continuum of households  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ h . A share  ) 1 ( slc −  of 
these households are not liquidity-constrained and indexed by  [ ) slc i − ∈ 1 , 0 . They have full 
access to financial markets, they buy and sell domestic and foreign assets (government bonds 
and equity). The remaining share slc of households is liquidity- constrained and indexed by 
[] 1 , 1 slc k − ∈ . These households do not trade on asset markets and consume their disposable 
income each period. Both types of households supply differentiated labour services to unions 
which maximise a joint utility function for each type of labour i. It is assumed that types of 
labour are distributed equally over the two household. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is 
introduced by assuming that the household faces adjustment costs for changing wages. These 
adjustment costs are borne by the household.  
 
 
1.2.1 Non Liquidity constrained households 
 
Households decide about four types of assets, domestic and foreign nominal bonds (
F i
t
i
t B B ,) ,  
stocks of domestic companies (
i
t tK Q ) and cash balances (
i
t M ).The household receives 
income from labour, nominal bonds and rental income from lending capital to firms plus 
profit income from firms owned by the household. Income from labour is taxed at rate t
w, 
rental income at rate t
i. We assume that income from financial wealth is subject to different 
types of risk. Domestic bonds yield risk-free nominal return equal to it. Domestic and foreign 
bonds are subject to (stochastic) risk premia linked to net foreign indebtedness. An equity 
premium on real assets arises because of uncertainty about the future value of real assets. The 
Lagrangian of this maximisation problem is given by 
   10
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The utility function is additively separable in consumption (
i
t C ) and leisure (
i
t L − 1 ). We 
assume CES utility for consumption and for leisure and in addition we allow for habit 
persistence. Thus temporal utility for consumption is given by  
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The investment decisions w.r.t. real capital are subject to convex adjustment costs, therefore 
we make a distinction between real investment expenditure (I) and physical investment (J). 
Investment expenditure of households including adjustment costs is given by 
 
(14) 
2 ,
,
,
, , ) (
2 2
) (
1
i j
t
I
i j
t
i j
t
I
t K i j
t
i j
t J
K
J u
J I Δ + ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ +
+ =
γ γ
   
 
The budget constraint is written in real terms with all prices expressed relative to the GDP 
deflator (P). Investment is a composite of domestic and foreign goods. The first order 
conditions of the household with respect to consumption and financial wealth are given by the 
following equations
4: 
 
                                                 
4 With an interest rate rule as specified below, an optimality condition for money would only determine the 
desired money holdings of the household sector without any further consequence for the rest of the economy. 
For that reason any further discussion on money demand is dropped here.   11
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All arbitrage conditions are standard, except for a trading friction on foreign bonds, which is 
modelled as a function of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. Using the arbitrage 
conditions, investment is given as a function of the variable  t Q  
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where  t Q  is the present discounted value of the rental rate of return from investing in real 
assets 
 
(16b)  δ
π
δ K
t
K
t
K
t t I
t t t
i
t
t t t i t Q
i t
E Q + − +
+ + −
−
= +
+
) 1 ( )
) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 (
( 1
1
  
 
  Notice, the relevant discount factor for the investor is the nominal interest rate minus 
expected inflation of investment goods. Also, because  t Q  and 
I
t π  are negatively correlated 
there is a positive equity premium. 
 
 
1.2.2 Liquidity constrained households 
 
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their entire labour 
income at each date. Real consumption of household k is thus determined by net wage income 
plus transfers minus a lump-sum tax 
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It is assumed that liquidity constrained households possess the same utility function as 
Ricardian households. 
 
 
1.2.3  Wage setting 
 
A trade union is maximising a joint utility function for each type of labour i where it is 
assumed that types of labour are distributed equally over constrained and unconstrained 
households with weights slc and (1-slc) respectively. The trade union sets wages by 
maximising a weighted average of the utility functions of Ricardian and liquidity constrained 
households. The wage rule is obtained by equating a weighted average of the marginal utility 
of leisure to a weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption times the real wage of 
these two household types, adjusted for a wage mark up   
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where 
W
t η   is the wage mark up factor, with wage mark ups fluctuating around  θ / 1  which is 
the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of labour services. The 
trade union sets the consumption wage as a mark up over the reservation wage. The 
reservation wage is the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of 
consumption. This is a natural measure of the reservation wage. If this ratio is equal to the 
consumption wage, the household is indifferent between supplying an additional unit of 
labour and spending the additional income on consumption and not increasing labour supply. 
Fluctuation in the wage mark up arises because of wage adjustment costs and the fact that a 
fraction (1-sfw) of workers is indexing the growth rate of wages 
W
t π  to wage inflation in the 
previous period.   
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Combining (18) and (19) one can show that the (semi) elasticity of wage inflation with 
respect to the employment rate is given by ( ) W γ κ / , i. e. it is positively related to the inverse 
of the labour supply elasticity and inversely related to wage adjustment costs. 
 
1.2.4 Aggregation 
 
The aggregate of any household specific variable 
h
t X  in per capita terms is given by 
∫ + − = =
1
0 ) 1 (
k
t
i
t
h
t t slcX X slc dh X X since households within each group are identical. Hence 
aggregate consumption is given by 
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and aggregate employment is given by 
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Since liquidity constrained households do not own financial assets we have 
0 = = =
k
t
F k
t
k
t K B B  . 
 
 
1.3  Trade and the current account  
 
The economies trade both final and intermediate goods. In order to facilitate aggregation we 
assume that households, the government and the corporate sector have identical preferences 
across final goods used for private consumption, public expenditure and investment. Let 
{ }
i G i G i i i I C I C Z
, , , , , ∈  be demand of an individual household, investor or the government, 
then their preferences are given by the following utility function 
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where the share parameter s
M can be subject to random shocks and 
i d Z  and 
i f Z  are indexes 
of demand across the continuum of differentiated goods produced respectively in the domestic 
economy and abroad, given by. 
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The elasticity of substitution between bundles of domestic and foreign goods 
i d Z  and 
i f Z  is 
σ . Thus aggregate imports are given by 
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where 
C P  and 
M P  is the (utility based) consumer price deflator. The exporters in both 
regions buy goods from their respective domestic producers and sell them in foreign markets. 
They transform domestic goods into exportables using a linear technology. Exporters act as 
monopolistic competitors in export markets and charge a mark-up over domestic prices. Thus 
export prices are given by 
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and import prices are given by 
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The mark ups fluctuate around 
X σ / 1   which is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties of exported goods.  Mark up fluctuations arises because of price adjustment 
costs. There is also some backward indexation of prices since a fraction of exporters (1-sfpx)  
is indexing changes of prices to past  inflation. The mark ups for export prices is also subject 
to random shocks 
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The final goods sector buys intermediate goods from both the domestic and foreign 
intermediate goods producers. Import demand for intermediate good h by the domestic 
economy is given by 
F
h D x ,  as determined by eq. (5d). Exports of good i denoted by 
D
i F x ,  is 
determined by the demand for imported intermediates of the foreign final goods sector as 
given by eq (6b). Notice, the number of imported and exported varieties of intermediate goods 
is not fixed but determined by market entry and exit of intermediate goods producers in both 
regions. Thus net foreign assets evolve according to 
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1.4 Policy 
 
1.4.1   Fiscal Policy 
 
On the expenditure side we assume that government consumption, government transfers  and 
government investment are proportional to GDP. R&D subsidies (SR&D) for the intermediate 
production sector are provided at a constant rate.  Government revenues 
G
t R are financed by 
taxes on consumption as well as capital and labour income. Government debt ( t B ) evolves 
according to 
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There is a lump-sum tax (
LS
t T)  used for controlling the debt to GDP ratio according to the 
following rule 
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where 
T b  is the government debt target.  
 
 
1.4.2   Central bank policy rule (interest rate rule) 
   15
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some 
smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation and output gap 
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The Central bank has a constant inflation target 
T π  and it adjusts interest rates whenever 
actual consumer price inflation deviates from the target and it also responds to the output gap. 
There is also some inertia in nominal interest rate setting. 
 
2.  Calibration 
   
2.1. Macro parameters 
 
The following table shows the parameter estimates for both regions with a special emphasis 
on those parameters which characterise the degree of real and nominal rigidity (see Ratto et 
al. (2006) for more detail on the estimation and other parameters).  
 
 
Table 1:  EA -  US Parameter Comparison - 1 
 EU  US 
Nom. Rigidities: 
Avg. duration between price adjustments (Quarters)  5  1.6 
Avg. wage contract length (Quarters)  5.6  5.8 
Real Rigidities: 
Labour adjustment cost (% of total add. wage costs)  18  10 
Labour supply elasticity (1/κ ) 1/2.9  1/.8 
Semi wage elasticity w. r. t. employment rate ( ) / w γ κ   0.11 0.03 
Capital adjustment cost  23  33 
Investment adjustment cost  16 12 
 
In terms of nominal and real rigidities, the estimates reveal clear differences which are largely 
consistent with prior expectations and other empirical evidence. This is most clear when it 
comes to price adjustment rigidities. US firms adjust prices more often. The average duration 
over which European firms keep prices fixed is about 5 quarters while US firms adjust prices 
on average every 1.6 quarters. This is consistent with recent evidence from micro studies. The 
estimates suggest that the duration of wage spells in the US is similar to those in the EU. 
There are however significant differences in the labour supply elasticity. A significantly 
higher elasticity in the US translates into a smaller response in US wages to changes in 
employment
5. Another estimation result that coincides well with a priori beliefs on 
employment protection are higher labour adjustment costs in the EA. According to these 
estimates, administrative costs of increasing employment amount to about 18% of total   
additional wage costs in the EU and only 10% in the US. There is less evidence on differences 
in capital adjustment costs.  
                                                 
5 This is consistent with the DG ECFINs Phillips curve estimates which also show a stronger response of wage 
inflation to unemployment in the Euro area compared to the US.   16
 
2.2. R&D sector 
 
For the calibration of R&D parameters we look for evidence in the literature, in EUROSTAT 
and OECD statistical databases and impose the restrictions of the balanced growth equations. 
The following sections discuss the two main domains of the necessary calibrations: the R&D 
production and the disaggregation of labour into three skill-groups. 
 
We start from the Jones (1995) version of R&D modelling, but we account for the 
international R&D spillovers following Botazzi and Peri (2007):  
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The first equation is the spillover-augmented version of Jones (1995) R&D production. This 
form of R&D equation accounts for international spillovers almost identically to the 
specification of Botazzi and Peri (2007). Equation (b) states the steady-state relationship 
between the growth of ideas gA and population gn, equation (c) shows the first order condition 
of R&D production, equation (d) is the definition of R&D-intensity: total R&D expenditure of 
the intermediate sector in percentage of GDP. The last equations state the arbitrage condition 
between the profit of the intermediate sector (π), and the per unit price of R&D inventions 
(PA) and the fixed (entry) cost FCA. Table 2 presents the sources and the methods of 
calibrating the different R&D variables. Although we do not have direct estimates of ν, ξ, φ 
and λ, we can use the existing literature and the model restrictions to get calibrated values for 
them. Data on the R&D share of labour ( t A L , ) and on the R&D intensity  ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛ Δ
t Y
D
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A P
is taken 
from OECD (2006b), the values of gA and gn are given in our baseline model. These values 
together with the restrictions of the balanced growth dynamics and the other variables of the 
baseline pin down λ and PA (see Table 2). The entry costs are calibrated according to Djankov 
et. al. (2002), and the estimations for R&D related subsidies are taken from Warda (2006). In 
order to set φ and ξ in the first step we express the sum of these two parameters from equation 
(b). In the second step we use the estimated long-term relationship between λ and ξ from 
Botazzi and Peri (2007) to approximate ξ separately. Botazzi and Peri (2007) do not estimate 
directly φ and ξ, however their estimated cointegration vector contains two coefficients μ and 
γ, satisfying the following theoretical restrictions between the long-term coefficients of λ, φ 
and ξ:  
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. The estimated values for these two coefficients 
show fairly big variations under the different regressions, and it might be inadequate to apply 
these long-term coefficients on our "contemporary" specification. However the ratios of these   17
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vary less, furthermore, imposing the ratio of the long-term 
parameters instead of their exact values is also less restrictive. To approximate our ξ for the 
EU27, we use the ratio of these parameters from the specification in which the authors 
omitted the US from their regressions
6. In the last step we subtract this value from the sum of 
φ and ξ as we calculated from equation (b) earlier. Since the authors do not provide 
estimations for the US separately we must rely on another source. Coe and Helpman (1995) 
estimates that the elasticity of total factor productivity is 0.033 and 0.234 with respect to 
foreign R&D and domestic R&D respectively. We impose this implied ratio between φ and ξ 
for the US. Coe and Helpman (1995) could also be used for approximating the EU27 
spillover-coefficients. Finally, the values for ν and θ can be obtained from expressions (a) and 
(e). 
 
 3.3. Skill-groups 
 
Labour force is disaggregated into three skill-groups: low-, medium- and high-skilled labour. 
The corresponding CES-function for labour has the following form: 
 
() ()
1 1 - 1 - 1 -
) ( + ) (
−
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ =
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
A H H H M M M L L L Y -L L s ef L ef s L ef s L  (f) 
 
where the subscripts denote the skill-groups (low-L, medium-M and high-H), si  is the 
population share of labour-force in subgroup i, Li denotes the employment rate of population 
i, efi is the efficiency unit, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between different labour 
types. Note that high-skilled labour in the final goods sector is the total high-skill employment 
minus the high-skilled labour working for the R&D sector (LA). The calibration is mostly 
based on EUROSTAT and OECD data (see Table 2 for sources and methods). Data on skill-
specific population shares, participation rates and wage-premiums are obtained from OECD 
(2006a), the Labour Force Survey and Science and Technology databases of EUROSTAT. 
The elasticity of substitution between different labour types (σ) is one of the major issue 
addressed in the labour-economics literature. We follow Caselli and Coleman (2006) which 
analysed the cross-country differences of the aggregate production function when skilled and 
unskilled labour are imperfect substitutes. The authors argue in favour of using the Katz and 
Murphy (1992) estimate of 1.4. We set the efficiency of low-skilled at 1 for EU27, the other 
efficiency units are restricted by the labour demand equations which imply the following 
relationship between wages, labour-types and efficiency units:  
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6 The full sample consists of fifteen OECD countries including the US and ten member states of the European 
Union.    18
Note that these efficiencies are proportional to the relative population shares. In order to get 
comparable efficiency units we must normalize with the population share using the following 
correction: 
 
() σ − = 1
1
*
i i i i l s ef ef . 
 
The large difference of the corrected efficiencies of high skilled labour between US and EU27 
are explained by the almost three times higher skill premiums in the US. 
 
Table 2:  EA -  US Parameter Comparison - 2 
 EA  US  Source 
R&D sector      
LA 0.010 0.017 EUROSTAT/OECD 
R&D intensity (%)  1.860 2.670 EUROSTAT/OECD 
λ  0.779 0.900 calibration (constrained by equations) 
φ  0.344 0.771 Botazzi-Peri (2007)/Coe-Helpman (1995) 
ξ  0.552 0.109 Botazzi-Peri (2007)/Coe-Helpman (1995) 
δ (R&D efficiency)  0.190 0.261 calibration (constrained by equations) 
Intermediate sector   
markup 0.11 0.12 ECFIN 
fixed costs  0.38 0.02 Djankov et. al. (2002) 
Skill composition   
sL  0.350 0.121 EUROSTAT/OECD 
sM 0.588 0.803 EUROSTAT/OECD 
sH  0.062 0.076 EUROSTAT/OECD 
LL  0.572 0.600 EUROSTAT/OECD 
LM 0.744 0.774 EUROSTAT/OECD 
LH 0.837 0.871 EUROSTAT/OECD 
σ (elas. subs.)  1.400 1.400 Katz and Murphy (2002) 
L 0.689 0.760 EUROSTAT/OECD 
Skill premium % 
(high vs. medium) 
27.25 72.00 EUROSTAT/OECD 
Skill premium % 
(high vs. medium) 
56.38 53.84 EUROSTAT/OECD 
ef
*
L  1.000 1.000 calibration (constrained by equations) 
ef
*
M  4.782 4.517 calibration (constrained by equations) 
ef
*
H  11.114 30.141 calibration (constrained by equations) 
Taxes, subsidies and final good 
mark-ups 
 
Subsidies for intermediate sector  0.366 0.346 Warda (2006)  
Labour taxes  0.386 0.306 ECFIN 
Final good mark up  0.242 0.205 ECFIN 
Intermediate good mark up  0.100 0.110 ECFIN 
 
We estimate mark ups for the final and the intermediate goods sector. In this paper we assume 
that the manufacturing sector uses patents to produce intermediates goods which are sold 
(together with services) in the final goods sector. For calculating mark ups we use a method   19
suggested by Roeger (2005). It is interesting to observe that US firms in the final goods sector 
charge a lower mark up while the mark up in the intermediate goods sector is lower in the EU  20
                                                                                                                                                                               
3. Simulation results 
 
This section shows which of the structural differences that we have identified to exist between 
the US and the EU could possibly account for the productivity and employment gap that we 
observe between the two economies. 
 
3.1 Changing the degree of product market competition. 
In this model, product market competition has ambiguous effects on GDP and productivity. 
The effects depend strongly on the sector in which the mark up reduction occurs, in the 
intermediate or the final goods sector. In the intermediate sector positive mark ups are 
required to cover the fixed costs associated with the acquisition of a patent which is a 
prerequisite for market entry. What is relevant for entry of new firms is the size of profits, this 
is a positive function of the mark up and the scale of production (i. e. it is inversely related to 
the number of intermediate producers). Lowering the mark up reduces profits of the average 
firm. Entry costs can only be covered by increasing the scale of production which requires 
some firms to exit. This reduces the variety of products supplied to the final goods sector and 
therefore reduces the level of technology.  
 
Our estimates suggest that the US mark up in manufacturing exceeds the mark up in the EU 
by 1% point. Table A1 shows that this difference only explains a small fraction of the 
productivity gap. Though resources would be shifted from final production into R&D, this 
would also be associated with a decline in capital formation, thus final output and GDP would 
not increase substantially. Interestingly, because capital formation is lower, private 
consumption will increase.  
 
Changing product market competition in the final goods sector leads to an ambiguous output 
responses especially in the long run (see Table A2). While a reduction in final goods 
competition unambiguously increases demand for labour and intermediate products (capital) 
of the final goods sector it also increases wages (of high skilled workers) and therefore the 
price of R&D output which is a fixed cost for intermediate goods producers. If the increase in 
fixed costs exceeds the price of intermediates, firms will exit the market. The overall growth 
effect depends on whether the accumulation of capital and the employment expansion 
dominate the loss of variety. Given our parameterisation of the model
7, decreasing the mark 
up in the final goods sector substantially increases GDP and productivity. Reducing the mark 
up by 4% point in final goods production could reduce the GDP per capita gap by about 4% in 
the long run. The long run increase of employment would be around .6%. When comparing 
this result with the effects obtained by Bayoumi et al. which arrive at a long run GDP effect of 
6% and an employment effect of 3% one has to be careful since our estimated mark up gap is 
only one third of the gap assumed by Bayoumi et al. 
 
                                                 
7 The fact that final goods firms import intermediate goods from abroad is crucial for that result. Without trade in 
intermediates the wage increase would eventually reduce the demand for intermediates   21
3.2 Reducing entry barriers: 
Decreasing fixed entry costs (0.4% of GDP) lowers the profits requirement for intermediate 
producers and increases entry of new firms. As shown in Table A3, increased demand for 
patents increases the demand for high skilled worker and leads to some relocation of high 
skilled workers from production to the R&D sector. The growth effect is, however, not 
substantial. The reason is a price increase for patents for two reasons. First, the demand for 
high skilled workers increases the wage of high skilled workers and second, the price of 
patents increases (because of rising marginal cost in the R&D sector. This partly compensates 
for the decline in entry costs.  
    
3. Reducing labour taxes: 
Reducing labour taxes has employment and productivity effects since it increases the supply 
of all skill groups (see Table A4). There are however important dynamic effects. In the short 
run, increased labour supply increases investment (and the interest rate). This reduces the 
PDV of profits in the intermediate sector and leads to firms exiting this sector. As interest 
rates decline the number of R&D workers increases and TFP rises slightly in the long run. 
(Notice the model predicts some temporary slowdown of TFP growth as a result of labour 
market reforms, not inconsistent with what we see in the data). The productivity gap with the 
US falls by about 1.8% in the long run. The main effect is on employment which would 
increase by 4.7%. The elasticity of employment w. r. t. labour taxation is similar to the 
estimates obtained by Daveri et al. The skill premium increases slightly because the labour 
supply of low skilled increases more strongly than that of high skilled workers (non linearity 
in the labour supply curve).  
 
4. Skill composition (increasing the share of high skilled and reducing low skilled): 
Shifting labour from low to medium skilled and then from medium to high-skilled in order to 
reach the US share of high-skilled labour will not have a strong growth effect (see Table A5). 
The large fraction of the additional high skilled labour will be employed in the production of 
final goods (replacing medium skilled workers). However, there is an increase in employment 
in the R&D sector because of a decline in the wage of high skilled workers. This reduces the 
price of patents and stimulates entry in the intermediate goods sector. Notice the employment 
share of R&D workers increases over time but the nominal R&D share declines because of 
the wage reduction.  
    
5. R&D subsidies: 
Differences between Europe and the US concerning R&D subsidies are small. OECD 
estimates (see Warda (2006)) suggest that the subsidy rate for R&D is about 2% points higher 
in the EU. Because of positive externalities associated with R&D investment (in particular 
due to the positive effect of the knowledge capital stock for R&D output), reducing subsidies 
in the EU to US levels would further widen the income gap between Europe and the US and 
slightly reduce the R&D expenditure share (see Table A6). 
 
6. All shocks together: 
Table A7 shows the results when all shocks are combined. A priori we expect not to explain 
the whole income and employment gap since we are not taking into account all differences. 
For example we are not considering differences in the efficiency of high skilled labour which 
we have imposed in the calibration. Another area where differences exist is the R&D 
technology itself. The existing estimates suggest that the output elasticity of R&D workers (as 
well as the average productivity) is larger in the US. This is compensated by Europe 
benefiting more strongly from technology spillovers. According to this simulation exercise   22
about 75% of the productivity gap could be explained.  Mark up differences in the final goods 
sector accounts for the bulk of the productivity gap, followed by labour taxes and the skill 
composition of the labour force. There are important other factors which we have left out in 
this analysis namely differences in the efficiency of high skilled workers and the higher 
output elasticity of R&D workers in the US. Slightly more than 25% of the employment gap 
is explained by the factors considered in this paper. Reducing the labour tax is the most 
important factor. There remain other differences between the US and European labour market 
(specially labour supply behaviour), namely a lower labour supply elasticity and a higher 
wage mark up in the EU which are potentially important factors for explaining the remaining 
employment gap. While we are successful in explaining a substantial fraction of the 
productivity and employment gap we are less successful in explaining the skill premium and 
the R&D expenditure share. Moving to US institutional settings and endowments increases 
rather than reduces the skill premium. As can be seen from Table 3 this is mainly due to an 
increase in the share of high skilled workers, while the other factors we are considering do not 
contribute significantly towards an increase in the skill premium. The R&D expenditure share 
is rather insensitive to the factors we are considering in this paper as well as the magnitude of 
the shocks we have considered here. As shown in the appendix, the R&D expenditure share 
seems to be largely determined by the R&D technology itself. 
 
Table 3. US-EU gaps explained by differences in exogenous variables 
 Y/L  L  Skill  premium   
high vs. medium 
Skill premium 
medium vs. low 
R&D/Y  
Lower mark up (final)  4.21  0.63 0.00 0.49  0.08
Increase mark up 
(intermediates) 
0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00  0.00
Reducing entry barrier  0.10  0.05 0.23 0.04  0.02
Reducing labour tax  1.78  4.95 1.03 3.94  -0.07
Skill composition  1.34  0.28 -19.90 -4.10  -0.27
R&D subsidies  -0.26  0.12 -0.02 0.09  -0.00
Sum  
(without R&D subsidies) 
7.55 5.91 -18.94 0.24  -0.26
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Reaching approximately US levels of productivity and employment are the most prominent 
Lisbon targets. This paper uses a multi country endogenous growth model to identify possible 
sources for the productivity gap between the EU and the US and to look at policies which 
could help to close this gap. The framework allows us to explain a significant fraction of the  
productivity and employment gap in terms of differences in goods market conditions, labour 
taxation and the skill composition of the labour force. These factors are however less 
successful in explaining skill premia and R&D investment shares. Concerning skill premia the 
results suggest that the high skilled segment of the labour market is not really comparable. 
Further work is needed to endogenize the skill premium, possibly by looking more into 
human capital formation. Concerning the R&D expenditure share the model suggests that 
differences in the efficiency of the R&D sector are important determinants.  
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Table A1. Increasing the mark-up of the intermediate sector to the US-level 
              (from 11% to 12%) 
         
Series  2007Q1      2008Q1  2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1    2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER  0.08 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.11 
E_GDPR_PCER  0.08 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.03 
E_C_PCER  0.09 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.20 
E_I_PCER 0.01  0.01  -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.26 -0.45 
E_LRD_PCER  0.43 1.43 1.90 1.49 0.79 0.13 0.13 
E_LHY_PCER  -0.10 -0.23 -0.37 -0.33 -0.18 -0.03 -0.03 
E_LMY_PCER  -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
E_LLY_PCER  -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
E_L_PCER  -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
E_WR_PCER 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.09 
E_WRH_PCER  0.11 0.37 0.46 0.42 0.32 0.17 0.11 
E_WRM_PCER  0.05 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.09 
E_WRL_PCER  0.05 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.09 
E_TFP_PCER 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.26 0.37 0.37 
E_K_PCER  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.23 -0.43 
E_RANDD_ER 0.03  0.04  0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 
PRD/PY  1.32 1.21 1.01 0.68 0.32 -0.07  -0.13 
PIX/PY  0.05 0.76 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.98 1.14 
USEUGAP  9.88 9.80 9.80 9.79 9.76 9.81 9.88 
 
 
Table A2. Decreasing the mark-up in the final good sector to US-level (24.2% to 20.5%) 
 
Series  2007Q1      2008Q1  2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1    2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER  0.35 1.51 2.27 2.49 3.21 4.69 4.58 
E_GDPR_PCER  0.17 1.08 1.97 2.72 3.61 4.23 3.61 
E_C_PCER  -1.01 -1.78 -1.34 -0.36 1.25  5.13  5.55 
E_I_PCER  4.18  13.39 16.09 12.46 10.32  8.51  5.91 
E_LRD_PCER  1.45 4.31 4.63 3.39 1.67 -0.60  -0.53 
E_LHY_PCER  0.01 0.13 -0.02  -0.13 0.24 0.54 0.46 
E_LMY_PCER  0.20 0.92 1.14 0.89 0.86 0.55 0.46 
E_LLY_PCER  0.27 1.23 1.82 1.71 1.69 1.07 0.90 
E_L_PCER  0.23 1.02 1.32 1.10 1.08 0.68 0.57 
E_WR_PCER 0.93 3.53 5.16 5.92 6.60 8.29 8.31 
E_WRH_PCER  1.25 4.57 6.21 6.82 7.24 8.43 8.42 
E_WRM_PCER  0.93 3.57 5.26 6.06 6.77 8.43 8.42 
E_WRL_PCER  0.79 2.99 4.61 5.44 6.15 8.03 8.09 
E_TFP_PCER 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.35 0.58 0.18 -0.12 
E_K_PCER  0.08 0.88 3.02 6.54 8.92 8.82 6.22 
E_RANDD_ER 0.13  0.18  0.17 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.08 
PRD/PY  6.12 7.52 7.49 7.61 7.47 8.01 8.07 
PIX/PY  2.30 4.33 3.57 2.11 0.67 -1.85  -1.24 
USEUGAP  9.87 9.47 8.98 8.51 7.73 5.78 5.79 
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Table A3. Decreasing the fixed costs of the intermediate sector to the US-level 
              (from 0.3849 to 0.0169) 
 
Series  2007Q1      2008Q1  2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1    2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER  -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.07  0.13  0.15  0.14 
E_GDPR_PCER  -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.07  0.16  0.17  0.16 
E_C_PCER  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.16 
E_I_PCER  0.02 0.10 0.25 0.42 0.32 0.22 0.14 
E_LRD_PCER  1.49 5.15 7.13 5.74 3.17 1.05 1.05 
E_LHY_PCER  -0.20 -0.86 -1.40 -1.25 -0.69 -0.23 -0.22 
E_LMY_PCER  -0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 
E_LLY_PCER  0.00 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.07 
E_L_PCER  0.01 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.04 
E_WR_PCER 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 
E_WRH_PCER  0.26 0.87 1.15 0.96 0.59 0.28 0.27 
E_WRM_PCER  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.09 
E_WRL_PCER  0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.08  0.06 
E_TFP_PCER 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.54 0.94 1.25 1.25 
E_K_PCER  0.00 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.26 0.22 0.15 
E_RANDD_ER 0.10  0.15  0.16 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.02 
PRD/PY  4.21 3.89 3.29 2.21 1.04 0.08 0.07 
PIX/PY  -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 
USEUGAP  10.02 10.06 10.08 10.05  9.97  9.88  9.89 
 
 
Table A4. Decreasing labour taxes to US-level (38.6% to 30.5%) 
 
Series  2007Q1      2008Q1  2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1    2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER  0.42 2.94 4.68 5.45 6.02 6.47 6.42 
E_GDPR_PCER  0.35 2.32 4.46 6.20 6.95 7.19 7.08 
E_C_PCER  0.18 0.87 1.91 3.95 5.63 6.55 6.72 
E_I_PCER  5.66  18.95 23.99 15.85 10.01  9.81  9.54 
E_LRD_PCER  -0.29 -0.81 -0.15 2.84  2.73  0.62  0.62 
E_LHY_PCER  0.09 1.20 2.11 1.94 2.12 2.59 2.58 
E_LMY_PCER  0.17 1.48 2.89 3.59 3.80 3.77 3.75 
E_LLY_PCER  0.43 2.53 5.21 7.02 7.52 7.46 7.42 
E_L_PCER  0.24 1.74 3.47 4.47 4.76 4.72 4.70 
E_WR_PCER -0.06 -0.18 -0.35 -0.20 0.20  0.58  0.56 
E_WRH_PCER  0.03 0.43 0.85 1.69 2.15 2.20 2.17 
E_WRM_PCER  0.02 0.15 0.23 0.50 0.97 1.37 1.35 
E_WRL_PCER  -0.22 -1.08 -1.76 -1.87 -1.55 -1.13 -1.14 
E_TFP_PCER -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.06  0.38  0.63  0.59 
E_K_PCER  0.11 1.22 4.38 9.27  10.47  9.84 9.57 
E_RANDD_ER  -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 
PRD/PY  -1.08  -0.27 0.74 2.59 2.83 2.22 2.21 
PIX/PY  -2.02 -1.41 -1.93 -2.22 -1.96 -1.68 -1.60 
USEUGAP  9.80 8.71 8.74 8.98 8.69 8.19 8.22   26
Table A5. Increasing high skilled share to US level 
                  
Series  2007Q1              2008Q1 2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1    2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER  0.31  0.61 0.87 1.08 1.27 1.45  1.50 
E_GDPR_PCER  0.19  0.49 0.79 1.09 1.37 1.60  1.64 
E_C_PCER  0.43  0.64 0.82 1.02 1.23 1.47  1.58 
E_I_PCER  0.35  1.28 1.88 1.85 1.68 1.77  1.85 
E_LRD_PCER  -1.28  -2.06 3.25 9.47 5.75 1.49  1.48 
E_LHY_PCER  1.78  8.24  16.67 23.32 25.52 26.48  26.48 
E_LMY_PCER 0.07  0.12  -0.03 -0.20 -0.24 -0.31  -0.31 
E_LLY_PCER -0.35  -1.47  -2.70 -3.62 -3.81 -3.95  -3.95 
E_L_PCER  0.03  0.11 0.24 0.35 0.35 0.26  0.26 
E_WR_PCER  0.25  0.18 0.25 0.40 0.48 0.64  0.68 
E_WRH_PCER  -1.71  -6.61      -10.87  -13.49  -14.35    -14.67    -14.64 
E_WRM_PCER  0.05  0.25 0.52 0.77 0.93 1.14  1.18 
E_WRL_PCER  1.64  2.14 2.74 3.35 3.59 3.86  3.90 
E_TFP_PCER -0.00  -0.03  -0.01  0.40  1.18  1.75  1.74 
E_K_PCER  0.01  0.08 0.31 0.82 1.32 1.75  1.85 
E_RANDD_ER -0.18  -0.20  -0.15 -0.11 -0.20 -0.27 -0.27 
PRDPY  -8.84  -9.10  -9.66      -11.36  -13.50  -14.89  -14.86 
PIXPY  0.37  0.05 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.02  -0.07 
USEUGAP  9.70  9.45 9.31 9.20 9.00 8.70  8.66 
 
  
 
Table A6. Decreasing the subsidies (intermediate sector) to the US-level 
              (~-2%) 
         
Series 2007Q1  2008Q1  2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1 2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER -0.00  0.02  0.03  0.01  -0.02  -0.10  -0.12 
E_GDPR_PCER 0.00  0.02  0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.10  -0.11 
E_C_PCER -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13 
E_I_PCER 0.08  0.28  0.35  0.22  0.08  -0.08  -0.10 
E_LRD_PCER -0.27  -0.93  -1.29 -1.00 -0.52 -0.18 -0.18 
E_LHY_PCER 0.03  0.15  0.27  0.25  0.17  0.10  0.09 
E_LMY_PCER -0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.07 
E_LLY_PCER -0.00  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.12  0.14  0.14 
E_L_PCER -0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.04  0.08  0.09  0.09 
E_WR_PCER -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22 -0.23 
E_WRH_PCER -0.04  -0.15  -0.21 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 
E_WRM_PCER 0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.20 -0.21 
E_WRL_PCER 0.00    0.00  -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -0.25 -0.26 
E_TFP_PCER -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.16 -0.22 -0.22 
E_K_PCER 0.00  0.02  0.06  0.13  0.13  -0.07  -0.10 
E_RANDD_ER -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
PRD/PY -0.75  -0.69  -0.60  -0.43 -0.26 -0.18 -0.19 
PIX/PY -0.04  -0.03  -0.06  -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.02 
USEUGAP 10.00  9.97  9.98  10.04  10.11  10.21  10.23 
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Table A7. Full change of EU economy close to US (combination of all shocks without the 
R&D subsidy shock) 
 
Series  2007Q1       2008Q1 2010Q1 2015Q1 2025Q1 2100Q1   2200Q1 
E_Y_PCER 1.05  5.30  8.21  9.63  11.27  13.63  13.36 
E_GDPR_PCER 0.77  4.02  7.51  10.62  12.80  14.08  13.19 
E_C_PCER -0.51  -0.16  1.54  4.93  8.64  14.22  14.88 
E_I_PCER 10.58  34.89  43.94  32.35  23.96  21.46  17.99 
E_LRD_PCER 1.90  8.84 18.08  23.32  13.04 2.63  2.65 
E_LHY_PCER 1.86  9.72 18.57  24.78 28.38 30.53 30.43 
E_LMY_PCER 0.36  2.43  4.00  4.39  4.51  4.17  4.06 
E_LLY_PCER 0.21  1.97 4.01 4.91 5.15  4.50  4.30 
E_L_PCER 0.43  2.83  5.09  6.04  6.25  5.81  5.68 
E_WR_PCER 1.38 4.05 5.56  6.57 7.80  10.04  9.96 
E_WRH_PCER -0.53  -1.85  -3.86 -5.28 -5.77  -5.08  -5.18 
E_WRM_PCER 1.12  4.42  6.40  7.69  9.16  11.52  11.41 
E_WRL_PCER 2.99  4.81  6.08  7.28  8.69  11.27 11.24 
E_TFP_PCER 0.01 0.08 0.39 1.56 3.31  4.00  3.74 
E_K_PCER 0.20  2.26  8.04  17.56  22.22  21.88  18.41 
E_RANDD_ER 0.03  0.08  0.12  0.11  -0.11  -0.27  -0.26 
PRD/PY 0.82  1.92  1.33  -0.26  -3.95  -6.03  -6.12 
PIX/PY 0.29  3.51  2.23  0.56  -0.59  -2.75  -1.88 
USEUGAP 9.32  7.42  6.82  6.41  5.04  2.44  2.55 
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Appendix. Deriving the steady-state R&D share in a symmetric multiregional model 
 
The Economic Environment 
Suppose we have M identical regions each of them having the following simplified economic 
structure: 
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Steady state growth rates 
To solve for the steady state growth rate of the economy, rewrite (A4) and use the time-
derivatives assuming condition (A8): 
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From the symmetric structure of the model follows that  
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m
D m: , therefore the aggregate production function can be rewritten as 
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The constancy of the capital-output ratio then implies that the growth rate of output is given 
by 
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Given the price of R&D designs determined by the arbitrage equation (A7), the Research 
Institute maximizes its profit when the marginal productivity equals to the real wage paid by 
the institute: 
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Notice that along the balanced growth path the share of R&D in output, s, is constant, 
therefore: 
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Dividing (A12) by  t D A ,  and differentiating we can solve for 
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The arbitrage equation can be rewritten as 
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Intermediate sector's profit 
 
Denote the rental cost of capital by iK for all regions. The profit-maximization of the 
intermediate sector requires the following first order condition: 
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where from the symmetric structure of the model it follows that   32
 
(A15')  K
t
t
t
t
t
t
t t i
K
Y
A M
K
A M
K
A M Y = − = ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅
⋅ −
− −
ζ
α θη ζ α θη
θ θ
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 1
 
 
and the intermediate sector's profit is given by 
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Steady state R&D intensity 
Substituting (16) into (A7') reveals: 
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Notice that  t A P ,  can be expressed from (A12-A13) as 
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Therefore the steady-state R&D share, s: 
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Notice that setting 
M
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= ζ , we can further simplify the steady-state R&D share: 
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Analysis 
Equation (A19) reveals an important characteristic of the model: the steady state R&D share 
is determined by the fundamental parameters (mark-ups, population growth-rates, equilibrium 
interest rate, the parameters of the idea production-function) of the model and the effective 
tax/subsidy of the intermediate sector. 
 
Denote the final and intermediate sector's mark-ups by mpf and mpi respectively where 
η
1
1 = + f mp  and 
θ
1
1 = + i mp . Therefore the R&D share in terms of fundamental parameters 
and the effective tax rate takes the following form (the effects of parameters are displayed in 
parenthesis): 
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Notice that Table 3 corresponds to the signs of the effects on the parameters above: 
decreasing the markup in the final, and increasing it in the intermediate sector indeed 
increased the R&D share (although our intermediate markup changed very little) while the 
lower subsidies resulted in lower R&D intensity.  
 
Steady state LA/LY ratio 
To calculate the ratio of labour devoted R&D relative to the final good sector's employment 
we can use the assumption that wages are equal across sectors. Then from (A6) and (A13): 
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We can rewrite this ratio as (A20): 
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Comparing (A21) and (A20) we can see a major difference between the "nominal" and "real" 
ratio of resources devoted to R&D: the "real" ratio measured in terms of labour does not 
depend on the final good sector's mark-up while the "nominal" R&D intensity is decreasing in 
it. Note that since our model much more complex then the one presented here, (A20) and 
(A21) give only an insight into the driving forces of our results and it is not directly applicable 
to calculate the final effects of various shocks. 
 